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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE: DEFINING THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995)
I. FACTS
On January 5, 1991, Isaac Evans was stopped by a Phoenix police
officer for traveling the wrong way down a one-way street.' After Evans
explained to the officer that his driver's license had been suspended, the
officer ran Evans' name through the computer in his patrol car. 2 The
search showed that Evans' license had been suspended and an arrest
warrant existed on an outstanding misdemeanor charge. 3 At that time,
the officer arrested Evans for the outstanding warrant, not the suspended
license.4 While handcuffing Evans, Evans dropped a handrolled ciga-
rette. 5 After determining that the cigarette contained marijuana, the
officer searched Evans' car and found a bag of marijuana under the
passenger seat.6
As a result of the search, Evans was charged with possession of
marijuana.7 Thereafter, Evans filed a motion to suppress evidence of the
marijuana, claiming his arrest violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 8 The misdemeanor warrant had been quashed seventeen
days prior to his arrest; however, an error in the computer records left
the warrant on file.9
On April 15, 1991, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion to suppress.10 At the hearing, the chief clerk of the East Phoenix
Number One Justice Court presented the court's records regarding the
warrant on Evans.11 Under Maricopa County procedure for quashing a
warrant, a court clerk calls the Sheriff's Office to inform them that a
warrant has been quashed, and logs this call in the justice court file.12
1. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660).
2. Id. The arresting officer did what is referred to as a "wants and warrants" check. Brief for
Respondent at 2, Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660). The computer reported a
"hit" which reflected an active misdemeanor warrant. Id.




7. Id. at 3.
8. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Evans (No. 93-1660).
9. Brief for Respondent at 2. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660). Seventeen
days earlier, Evans had appeared in justice court on a bench warrant for failure to appear on several
traffic tickets. Id.
10. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Evans (No. 93-1660).
11. Id. at 3-4.
12. Id. at 4.
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The Sheriff's Office then notes the call and removes the warrant from
the computer records.13
Evans' justice court file, however, contained no notice indicating
that the Sheriff's Office had been called about the quashed warrant.
14
When asked, the justice court chief clerk could not say conclusively
whether a call had been made, or whether the caller failed to make the
proper notation. 15 Nonetheless, the court clerk surmised that the call had
not been made. 16 The clerk supported this conclusion by the fact that
three other warrants which had been quashed on the same day as Evans'
were also not removed from the computer system, and these files also
contained no notation that the Sheriff's Office had been informed. 17
The trial court did not determine whether the justice court or
Sheriff's Office personnel were responsible for the failure to delete the
warrant from the computer.18  The court did, however, determine that
regardless of whether the fault lay with the police department or the
justice court clerk, the State was at fault for the error in Evans' computer
records.19 The court granted the motion to suppress, and the State
appealed. 20 The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the
exclusion of evidence due to a clerical error that lay outside of the police
department's control would not deter court employees or the Sheriff's
Office from making similar errors in the future. 21 The Arizona Supreme
Court vacated the Appeals Court's ruling and determined that the
exclusionary rule should apply to deter future errors on the part of the
criminal justice system's record keepers, regardless of whether they are
affiliated with the police or the courts.22 The State of Arizona appealed
the decision to the United States Supreme Court, which granted
13. Id. at 5. The Sheriff's Office makes its notations on their "recall warrants list," which shows
the name of the person named on the warrant, his/her birthdate, the warrant number, and the date it
was issued. Id. This information is then compared with the corresponding Sheriff's Office active file
to verify the accuracy of the information. Id. If this information matches, the Sheriff's Office then
removes the warrant from the computer records. Id.
14. Id. at 4.
15. Brief for Respondent at 3, Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660).
16. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Evans (No. 93-1660).
17. Id. The chief court clerk also noted that Evans' case was unusual because a pro tem judge
had quashed the warrant and had not made the same notation on Evans' file regarding the quashing of
the warrant that the justice of the peace normally made. Id. at 4.
18. Brief for Respondent at 4, Evans (No. 93-1660).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024. 1027 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
22. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 871-72 (Ariz. 1994). The Arizona Supreme Court was also
concerned with the added impact computers might have on precipitating warrantless arrests. Id. at
872. The court stated that "[als automation increasingly invades modem life, the potential for
Orwellian mischief grows. Under such circumstances, the exclusionary rule is a 'cost' we cannot
afford to be without." Id.
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certiorari.23 The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment as a
result of clerical errors by court employees, causing incorrect computer
records, fell within the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.24
II. LEGAL HISTORY
A. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fourth Amendment provides that all persons should be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and that all warrants must be
supported by probable cause.25 However, the Fourth Amendment
contains no explicit provision precluding the use of evidence obtained in
its violation.26 In order to enforce the protections granted by the Fourth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
unconstitutionally obtained evidence typically cannot be used against a
defendant.27 This is the basic foundation of the exclusionary rule.28
The roots of the exclusionary rule can be traced to the 1886 case,
Boyd v. United States.29 In Boyd, the United States Supreme Court held
23. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1189 (1995).
24. Id. at 1193-94. In Evans, the Supreme Court also held that it had jurisdiction to review the
state court's decision because the decision rested primarily on federal law. Id. Evans had argued that
Arizona's good faith statute was the basis for the Arizona Supreme Court decision, and thus the United
States Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction. Brief for Respondent at 8-9, Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.
Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660). This Comment is confined to the Fourth Amendment issue of whether
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to the facts of this case.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." Id.
26. See id. The Court noted in United States v. Calandra, that "the rule is a judicially created
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights ... rather than a personal constitutional right
of the party aggrieved." 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). However, some commentators have argued that
the exclusionary rule is implicit in the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., Lawrence Crocker, Can the
Exclusionary Rule be Saved?, 84 J. CRlM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 310,312 (1993) (arguing that the best
means of preserving the exclusionary rule is to recognize it as implicit in the Fourth Amendment); see
also William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule:
Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEo. LJ. 365, 391-94, (1981) (arguing that Fourth
Amendment requirements of "probable cause" and "warrant" makes the exclusionary rule a
necessary remedy).
27. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (determining the exclusionary rule
upholds the Fourth Amendment by producing a deterrent effect); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-58
(1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is applicable in state courts); Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that illegally obtained evidence is inadmissable in federal courts).
28. The exclusionary rule has also been referred to as "The Suppression Doctrine." See, e.g.,
Warren E. Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1964) (criticizing the
exclusionary rule as a means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment).
29. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd was a civil suit involving a government forfeiture proceeding.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,617 (1886).
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for the first time30 that some types of evidence could not be admitted if
the evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 1
However, the Court did not exclude evidence under the Fourth
Amendment in a criminal context until 1914.32 In Weeks v. United
States,33 the Court held that illegally seized evidence was not admissible
in federal courts .34 Acting out of concern for the proper enforcement of
the Fourth Amendment,35 the Court extended the exclusionary rule to
illegal seizures conducted by federal agents.36
After Weeks, the Supreme Court gradually extended the scope of
the exclusionary rule 37 until 1949, when it decided Wolf v. Colorado.38
In Wolf, the Court declined to force states to comply with the federal
exclusionary rule through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 39 The Court instead elected to allow states to decide when
the exclusionary rule should apply, depending on the extent of the
police misconduct involved.40
This period of judicial restraint, characterized by Wolf, was merely
temporary. 41 As the Supreme Court entered the Warren era, 42 the Court
began to construe the exclusionary rule more liberally. 43 This gradual
30. Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and
Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1983)
(tracing the origins of the exclusionary rule to Boyd). See also Burger, supra note 28, at 4 (citing Boyd
as the origin of the exclusionary rule).
31. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,638 (1886). The central evidence in Boyd was Boyd's
private papers. Id. at 618. Thus, the Court merely excluded a type of illegally procured evidence,
"papers," which is explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Burger, supra note 28, at 5
(emphasizing that the exclusionary rule principle in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914),
distinguished between evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and illicit articles).
32. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
33. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
34. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,398 (1914).
35. Id. The Court stated that if law enforcement agencies were allowed to seize private
documents as evidence, the protection of the 4th Amendment "is of no value, and,. . . might as well be
stricken from the Constitution." Id. at 393.
36. Id. at 398.
37. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (holding that illegally
seized evidence could not be used even after returned to defendant); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 34 (1925) (holding that illegally seized contraband could not be admitted against the
defendant); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937) (holding that the exclusionary rule
applied to violations of federal statutes as well as the Constitution).
38. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
39. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949). The Due Process clause states that "[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
40. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31.
41. See Stewart, supra note 30, at 1379-80 (tracing the development of the exclusionary rule).
42. See GROLtER MutmEtA ENCYCLOPEDIA (CD Rom Version 7.0.2, 1995) (discussing briefly
Earl Warren's term as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1953 to 1969).
43. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958) (holding that evidence seized
incidental to an unlawful entry into a private dwelling was inadmissible); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (holding that evidence seized unlawfully by state police officers would be
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expansion culminated in 1961 with Mapp v. Ohio.44 This landmark case
involved obscene materials illegally seized from the defendant's home
by city police officers that were later used against the defendant in state
court.45
In Mapp, the Court overruled Wolf,46 and extended the exclusionary
rule to cover all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 47 As a result of the Mapp decision, all
illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible in a court of law, no matter
how probative. 48 The Court expressed its concern with protecting
average citizens from obtrusive and denigrating searches and seizures, by
focusing on citizens' right of privacy. 49 The Court further recognized
that illegally seized evidence should be excluded in order to promote
judicial integrity and respect for the law.50
Three years later, in Beck v. Ohio,51 the Court reiterated that the
exclusionary rule would be applied to any violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 52 In Beck, the Court found that even if police officers
believe that they are acting within the confines of the legal standards, the
evidence they obtain will be inadmissible if procured in violation of the
law.53
After Beck, some jurists advocated curtailing the breadth of the
exclusionary rule in certain instances. 54 Justice White, for example, felt
that courts were excluding too much valuable evidence because of the
exclusionary rule. 55 In the 1974 decision Calandra v. United States,56
excluded in federal courts). See also Stewart, supra note 30, at 1379-80 (discussing how the Elkins
decision led to the Mapp decision by extending the Fourth Amendment protections to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment).
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.644-46 (1961).
46. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949) (determining that the exclusionary rule did not
apply to the states via the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
47. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
48. Id. at 659.
49. Id. at 655-57.
50. Id. at 659. The Court commented that "[nothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Id.
51. 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
52. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,96 (1964).
53. Id. at 97 (quoting Henry v, United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959)).
54. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968) (finding that the exclusionary rule has its limitations
as a means of judicial control over police action); See also id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (noting
there are no limitations in the Constitution to prevent police from addressing questions to people on the
streets).
55. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (holding that the exclusionary rule
does not extend to one who was not the victim of the unlawful search). Justice White, writing for the
Court, noted that the extension of the exclusionary rule was not justified due to the public interest in
prosecuting criminals on the basis of truthful evidence. Id. at 174-75.
56. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
1996]
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the Court separated the violation of the Fourth Amendment from the
application of the exclusionary rule.57 The exclusionary rule would
only be invoked "where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served." 58 The Court stated that in some instances using
the fruits of a past unlawful arrest would not necessarily violate the
Fourth Amendment if excluding the evidence would have no deterrent
effect on police conduct .59 Thus, the emphasis of the test evolved from
protecting the rights of citizens60 to deterring violative conduct of law
enforcement .61
B. THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
As the last vestiges of the Warren Court began to fade in the
mid-1970s, 62 the Burger Court emerged, prepared to further limit the
scope of the exclusionary rule. 63 In United States. v. Janis,64 the Court
limited the exclusionary rule's application to instances where it would
cause "appreciable deterrence." 65
In the 1980s, political pressure mounted on the courts to punish
criminals and to ensure that fewer criminals were released on what were
perceived to be technicalities precipitated by the exclusionary rule.66
Legislation was advanced to allow illegally obtained evidence to be used
if the police officers, in good faith, believed that their actions were in
accordance with the law.67
57. Calandra v. United States,414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 348, 354.
60. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653-57 (1961) (finding that the exclusionary rule is
necessary to enforce the right to privacy).
61. See Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 (finding that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter future unlawful police conduct).
62. GROLIER MULTIMEDIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (CD Rom Version 7.0.2, 1995) (noting Warren E.
Burger's succession of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, serving from 1969 to
1986).
63. See Burger, supra note 28, at 1. As an Appeals Court judge, Burger had openly criticized the
Supreme Court's application of the exclusionary rule, referring to the exclusionary rule as "a
manifestation of sterile judicial indignation." Id. at 23.
64. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
65. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,454 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Gary S. Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HASTINGs LJ.
1065, 1067 (1982) (citing Exclusion Rule High on Reagan's Hit List!., NAT'L LJ., Aug. 10, 1981, at 21)
(naming abolition of the exclusionary as one method of crime control); Stewart, supra note 30, at 1393
(stating that the exclusionary rule has been seen as a hinderance to police officers); Crocker, supra
note 26, at 320 (stating that the Reagan and Bush Justice Departments challenged the constitutional
basis of the exclusionary rule).
67. See Stewart, supra note 30, at 1399 (citing the "Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1983,"
H.R. Doc. No. 98-32, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. 136 (1983), as an example of a congressional attempt at
codifying a good faith exception).
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In 1980, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Williams.68 Three
years later, in 1983, the Supreme Court fell just short of adopting the
good faith doctrine in Illinois v. Gates.69 Although Justice White urged
the Court to adopt the good faith exception, 70 the Court decided against
modifying the exclusionary rule in this case because the good faith
doctrine had not been raised in the lower state court proceeding. 7 1
The next year, in 1984, the Court applied the good faith doctrine in
United States v. Leon.72 In Leon, the Court determined that evidence
seized by officers acting in good faith reliance on a warrant issued
without probable cause was admissible through a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.73 The Court found that because judges have no
stake in the outcome of criminal trials, evidence obtained due to judicial
error should not be excluded.74 Thus, Leon represents not only the
Court's initial adoption of the good faith doctrine, but also indicates the
Court's emphasis on the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose.75
In cases subsequent to Leon, the Court continued to recognize, and
expand upon, the good faith doctrine. 76 As the evolution of the
exclusionary rule demonstrates, the central purpose for application of
the exclusionary rule has become deterrence of law enforcement
misconduct rather than prevention of police intrusion. Thus, the
primary issue the Court faced in Arizona v. Evans77 was whether this
deterrent purpose would be properly served by applying the
exclusionary rule to the errors of court clerks. 78
68. 622 F.2d. 830, 846 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (holding that heroin
seized during an unauthorized arrest was admissible when officers act in good faith that their actions
are authorized).
69. 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983). Gates drew exceptional attention from the legal community.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Attorneys General from the states of California, Florida, and
Virginia, the National District Attorneys Association, Inc., the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America, the American Bar Association, and the American Civil Liberties Union, among others.
Illinois v. Gates, 562 U.S. 213, 215 (1983).
70. Id. at 246 (White, J. concurring).
71. Id. at 221-24.
72. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
73. United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897,918-21 (1984).
74. Id. at 917.
75. See Fletcher V. Baldwin Jr., Due Process and the Exclusionary Rule: Integrity and
Justification, 39 U. FLA. L. Rev. 505, 532 (1987) (describing the impact of Leon on the exclusionary
rule).
76. See generally Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 990-91 (1987) (holding that the exclusionary
rule did not apply to evidence obtained by police who acted in reasonable reliance upon a statute
authorizing warrantless administrative searches, which was subsequently found to violate the Fourth
Amendment); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981. 990-91 (1984) (holding that evidence should
not be excluded because a judge failed to make necessary clerical corrections).
77. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
78. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1187-88 (1995).
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III. CASE ANALYSIS
In Arizona v. Evans,79 the Supreme Court reemphasized that the
exclusionary rule should apply only in situations where it will act as
deterrent for police misconduct.8 0 Furthermore, the Court stated that this
deterrent effect is not meant to apply to other state officials, such as
court clerks. 8 1 Excluding evidence due to the error of a court clerk,
reasoned the Court, would do little to deter or eliminate future errors.82
Furthermore, because the police officer who arrested Evans acted
properly, 83 application of the exclusionary rule serves no deterrent
purpose with respect to police conduct.8 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, 85 began the Court's
analysis by noting the limits of the exclusionary rule. 86  The Court
emphasized that the rule was designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment
rights through the rule's general deterrent effect. 87 Furthermore, the
rule's application was to be restricted to only those instances where its
remedial objectives are most efficaciously served. 88
The Court analogized the facts of Evans with those of Leon.8 9
Like Evans, Leon involved a police search where the officers acted in
reasonable reliance on a search warrant that the Court later determined
was invalid. 90 The Court cited its finding in Leon that because judges
and magistrates are not part of a law enforcement team, 91 the exclusion
of evidence would not serve as a deterrent.92
By relying on Leon as its foundation, the Court rejected the
Respondent's attempts to analogize Evans to other cases dealing with the
79. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
80. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995).
81. Id.
82. /d. at 1193-94.
83. Id. at 1193. The Court determined that the officer would have been "derelict in his duty" had
he failed to arrest Evans. Id.
84. Id. at 1193.
85. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1187.
86. Id. at 1191.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984); and United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
89. Id. at 1191-92 (comparing the facts with those in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
90. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,901-05 (1984).
91. Id. at 916-917. In Leon, the Court fails to specify expressly which officials are part of the
"law enforcement team." Id. However, the Court does state that law enforcement officers are
"engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id. at 914 (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). It has been suggested that this definition of those susceptible to
the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect is overly broad. See Burger, supra note 28, at 12-13
(suggesting that prosecutors are not part of the law enforcement team and are not effected by the
exclusionary rule's deterrent effect).
92. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 917).
174 [VOL. 72:167
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issuer of probable cause. 93 The Respondent claimed that the decision in
United States v. Hensley 94 suggested that admissibility hinges on
whether the information's issuer had probable cause to seize evidence. 95
The Court rejected this suggestion because no Fourth Amendment
violation occurred in Hensley, and thus the issue of whether the seized
evidence should have been excluded was not determined. 96 The
Respondent also cited the Court's holding in Whiteley v. Warden,
Wyoming State Penitentiary97 to support his argument that computer
information was not a sufficient basis for the officer's reliance. 98 Again,
the Court rejected the Respondent's comparison to Whiteley because at
the time that case was decided, the Court had not yet adopted the good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule.99
After refuting the Respondent's analogies, the Court proceeded to
apply Leon'slOO analytical framework to Evans.lO' The Court found that
if court employees were responsible for the erroneous computer records,
the exclusion of the evidence would not act as a sufficient deterrent to
prevent future errors. 102 The Court reasoned that because court clerks
are not connected to the law enforcement team, 103 they have no stake in
the outcome of the case. 104 The Court then inferred that due to the
clerks' neutral standing, exclusion of evidence would have no deterrent
effect on the clerks' conduct.105 Thus, since application of the rule
would not serve to deter clerks from failing to inform police officers that
a warrant had been quashed, the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule would not be fulfilled.106
Finally, the Court concluded that the police officer in Evans acted
reasonably by relying on the computer's information, and thus acted in
good faith. 107 Furthermore, the Court found it significant that the chief
93. Id. at 1192.
94. 469 U.S. 221, 236 (1985) (holding that reliance on another police department's wanted flyer
supported a reasonable suspicion which justified a stop).
95. Brief for Respondent at 21, Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660).
96. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,236 (1986)).
97. 401 U.S. 560,568 (1971) (holding that a police bulletin based on an inadequate complaint did
not provide probable cause for a warrantless arrest).
98. Brief for Respondent at 19-20, Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (No. 93-1660).
99. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1192-93 (referring to the precedential value of the application of the
exclusionary rule in Whiteley as "dubious") (citations omitted).
100. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text
(discussing the Leon analysis).
101. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193 (citation omitted).
102. Id.
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (describing the Court's definition of "law
enforcement team").
104. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1194.
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clerk of the justice court had testified that such computer errors occurred
only once every three or four years. 108 Thus, the police officer could
not have anticipated such an error. 109 For these reasons, the Court
concluded that clerical errors of court employees should be categorically
exempted from the exclusionary rule.llO
Justice O'Connor and Justice Souter each filed cautionary
concurrences, to which Justice Breyer joined, expressing their caveats
with the Court's opinion.I' In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor
warned officers that they cannot rely blindly on the information
provided through computers.11 2 Should computer information become
unreliable, the police officers would be expected to consider the
information with closer scrutiny.11 3 Justice Souter echoed O'Connor's
sentiments, and advocated a narrow understanding of the Court's
opinion."l 4 Souter asserted that the Court had not decided the question
of whether the exclusionary rule should be extended to the government
as a whole when computer error occurs. 1 5
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg filed dissenting opinions."l 6 In his
dissent, Justice Stevens contended that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule is not simply to deter police misconduct, but rather to prevent
unwarranted government intrusions."1 7  Stevens also countered the
Court's assertion that the exclusionary rule is an extreme sanction.
18
Stevens stated that the exclusionary rule merely puts police in the same
position they would have been had they not conducted the illegal
search."19
In concluding his dissent, Justice Stevens cautioned the Court of the
consequences of prematurely isolating computer records from the
exclusionary rule. 120 Such isolation, warned Stevens, could result in
widespread infractions of Fourth Amendment rights caused by careless
misuse of computers.121 Stevens asserted that the cost of enforcing the
108. Id. at 1193-94.
109. Evans, 115 S.Ct. at 1194.
110. Id.
11. Id. at 1194-95 (O'Connor, J.. and Souter, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1195 (O'Connor J., concurring.)
113. Id. at 1194.
114. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Souter, J., concurring).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1195, 1197 (Stevens, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens' philosophy of the exclusionary rule is similar
to the version of the rule as defined in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See supra notes 44-50 and
accompanying text (explaining the exclusionary rule as defined by Mapp v. Ohio).
118. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id.




exclusionary rule is minimal compared to the cost of allowing innocent
people to be unjustly arrested and interrogated.122
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg was equally uneasy about
resolving problems with computer technology too hastily.1 2 3
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the Court ignored the high
costs of allowing unwarranted arrests as the result of faulty computer
records.124 Justice Ginsburg asserted that as computers gain prominence,
the deleterious effect of minor computer errors will also grow.125 To
illustrate this, Justice Ginsburg pointed out the case of Terry Dean
Rogan, a man who was arrested three times at gunpoint over a two year
period because of a computer related error.126 Because of the enormous
impact computer errors can wield, Justice Ginsburg suggested that
application of the exclusionary rule to the errors of court clerks and
others dealing with computer records is not unreasonable and that the
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court should be affirmed.127
Although the concurring and dissenting opinions caution not to
assume the reliability of computer-relayed information, the Court's
opinion clearly allows law enforcement officers to assume the data they
receive via computer is accurate. The Court's decision in Arizona v.
Evans, therefore opens the door for law enforcement officers to rely
unconditionally on computer information, while limiting the scope of
the exclusionary rule.
IV. IMPACT
A. THE SCOPE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE HAS BEEN LIMITED
In Arizona v. Evans,128 the United States Supreme Court held that
the clerical errors of court employees are categorically exempted from
application of the exclusionary rule. 129 Thus, the Court has expanded
the umbrella of those untouched by the rule's deterrent effect to include
not only judges and magistrates, but court clerks and employees as
well.130 This further limitation on the exclusionary rule is consistent with
122. Id.
123. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1197-98 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1199.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing Rogan v. Los Angeles, 668 F. Supp. 1384, 1387-89 (C.D. Cal. 1987)).
127. Id. at 1200. Justice Ginsburg also dissented to the issue of whether the Court had jurisdiction
over this case. Id. at 1203. Because this Comment is confined to the issue of whether the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable in this case, the jurisdictional issue has not been
analyzed.
128. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
129. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1194 (1995).
130. The Court had previously held that evidence could not be excluded because of a judge's
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the Court's trend toward weakening the rule's powers.131 Interestingly,
only Justice Stevens suggested that the Court should apply the
exclusionary rule in all cases of Fourth Amendment infringements,
rather than simply in cases when police misconduct is so malevolent that
exclusion of evidence is the only proper sanction. 132 Thus, the
exclusionary rule as first envisioned in Mapp v. Ohio 133 is no more. In
fact, as some commentators have feared, the exclusionary rule may be in
danger of extinction.134
However, rumors of the exclusionary rule's impending death may
be exaggerated. Though the Court did not exclude evidence in Evans, it
reiterated that exclusion would be applied when necessary to deter police
misconduct. 135  Although the reach of the exclusionary rule may
continue to be curtailed and modified, it will continue to exist so long as
no alternative enforcement mechanism for the Fourth Amendment
exists.
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS MAY RELY ON COMPUTER DATA
REGARDLESS OF ITS ACCURACY
The Court's opinion in Arizona v. Evans failed to address the added
dimension computer technology brings to this case. 136 Instead, the
Court merely drew a line between the police department and court
clerks.137 However, as the Arizona Supreme Court pointed out, it seems
anomalous that evidence seized pursuant to a clerical error of a police
clerk would be excluded, while evidence seized due to the same error
made by a court clerk would be permitted.138 As computers become the
link between county offices and the police, information can be passed
clerical errors. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990-91 (1984) (finding that suppressing
evidence because the judge failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections will not serve the
deterrent function the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve)
131. See supra notes 56-78 and accompanying text (describing the Court's limitations on the
exclusionary rule throughout the 1970s and 1980s); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's expansion of the good faith exception prior to Evans).
132. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1195 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
134. Crocker, supra note 26, at 311-13; Baldwin, supra note 75, at 542-43; Richard A. Jochum,
Comment, I Come Not to Praise the Exclusionary Rule But to Bury It-United States v. Leon;
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 815, 819 (1985).
135. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1193.
136. See generally Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1185 (1995) (focusing upon incorrect
computer records caused by clerical errors of court employees). In its opinion, the Court failed to
acknowledge the rapidity with which computers can pass information from source to receiver.
Interestingly, the only reference made by the Court pertaining to the enhanced efficiency allowed by
computers is in noting how quickly the court clerks were able to correct the error. Id. at 1194.
137. Id. at 1193.
138. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869,872 (1994).
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between the two agencies at unfathomable speeds, causing this line to
blur.139 Making the distinction between the law enforcement team and
the detached magistrate, as the Court does in Evans, will no doubt
become increasingly difficult as reliance on computerized information
becomes more commonplace.
Furthermore, as law enforcement agencies become increasingly
dependent on computer information, it is critical that the information,
and the computers, be reliable.140 As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her
dissent, the FBI's nationwide computer data base contains over
twenty-three million records, and any error entered into this enormous
computer base spreads nationwide instantly.141 In Evans, the Court
found that the police officer's reliance on the erroneous computer
information was warranted due to the chief county clerk's testimony that
an error of this type occurred only once every three or four years.142
However, as computer information becomes increasingly utilized by law
enforcement, more errors may occur; and accordingly, the Court may
have to reevaluate its position on computer reliability.
Nonetheless, excluding evidence acquired as a result of such errors
may not be the solution to deterring carelessness on the part of those
who enter data into these powerful computer networks. As the Court
found in Evans, the county clerk who forgot to phone the sheriff's
office likely would not act with greater care had charges against Isaac
Evans been dropped due to his or her error. 143 If excluding evidence in
such cases would fail to deter such carelessness, application of the
exclusionary rule would serve no purpose, and potentially allow a guilty
party to go free.
139. See Robert Garcia, Garbage In, Gospel Out: Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability and
the Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1046-48 (illustrating the speed with which government
computers can relate information).
140. See Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1194 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that it would be
unreasonable for the police to rely on inaccurate recordkeeping). See also Garcia, supra note 139, at
1069-72 (finding that computer errors can result in improper arrests and millions of dollars in lost
revenues).
141. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1199 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1193-94.
143. Jd. at 1193.
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Undoubtedly, computers increase law enforcement efficiency by
allowing police officers access to important information in seconds. By
finding in Evans that the arresting officer's reliance on computer
information was reasonable, the Court has allowed law enforcement to
enter the information age.
Robert G. Manly
